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This paper explores the implications of examining the effect of policy changes on individual
incomes rather than household incomes. Conceptual problems arise from the treatment of
collective resources and responsibilities, particularly children. These are dealt with in a manner
that is transparent with the aim of establishing a practical method of analysing policy at the
individual (and gender-specific) level. Two policy-related issues are examined in this framework:
the impact of a minimum wage and the effect of introducing a minimum pension guarantee. In
each case, the implications of choosing the individual as the income unit are examined and an
analysis of the issue by gender is presented.
JEL classification: C81, D31, H55, J16.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most analysis of the effect of policy changes on the distribution of personal
incomes is carried out at the household level (Giles and Johnson, 1994; Redmond
and Sutherland, 1995). This happens for a combination of two reasons. First, in
many circumstances it is the household that is the most appropriate unit to
choose, since groups of people who live in the same dwelling and share some
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domestic arrangements are fairly likely to pool income and share decisions about
how to consume it. However, the use of the household is also convenient, since the
household budget surveys on which these studies usually rely are organised at the
household level: defining and computing household income is relatively
straightforward.
Ease of application combined with the attraction of conforming to a standard
method should not deter us from considering other units of analysis. On some
occasions, it may be appropriate to consider units wider than the household. The
case for this may be particularly strong in contexts where exchange of goods or
services in kind or informal community support is customary. It may also arise out
of the official system of taxes and cash transfers, if certain blood relationships are
held to imply financial responsibility, as with the current child support
arrangements in the UK. Household survey data may not be adequate to capture
and take account of the full range of financial and economic ties that households
have with each other.
In other situations, it is appropriate to look within the household and consider
the incomes of individuals. An interest in the differential impact of policy reforms
on men and women requires that we do this since, as Jenkins (1991) points out,
household-based measures obscure gender inequalities. Several recent UK studies
focus on the welfare or income of women. Webb (1993) analyses women’s
incomes in the context of their employment patterns and family circumstances.
Davies and Joshi (1994) highlight the importance to women of within-family
transfers and track how the importance of these has changed over time. The same
authors apply similar accounting rules to the relative importance of social security
and family sharing to female incomes over the lifetime (Davies and Joshi, 1995).
This paper establishes a framework within which to analyse the impact of
public policy measures on the incomes of men and women in a manner that is
consistent with household-based measures of the impact of policy. When
considering the impact of policy change at the household level, we measure the net
effect of the change on the individuals in the household. At the individual level, we
are able to observe the impact on each person: one person’s gain may be offset by
another’s loss. Policy changes that are revenue-neutral on a national basis usually
involve some households gaining and some losing. There may also be substantial
net transfers within households. Our approach is designed to illuminate the extent
to which these occur and to account for the incomes of all adults within the
household, not just the relative incomes of the partners in couples. Although much
of the detailed work on within-household financial management focuses on couples
(Vogler and Pahl, 1993), households may contain further adults or may consist of
a collection of adults none of whom are in couples. Indeed, in the Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) data used for the present analysis, only 54 per cent of
adults live in couples without additional adults resident in the household. Of the
remainder, 17 per cent live on their own or only with children and 29 per cent
share households with adults who are not their partners. Less is known about theWomen, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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financial relationships between, for example, young adults living with their parents
or pensioners sharing households with their adult children. In relation to the former
group, Jones (1992) describes a ‘grey area between childhood dependence and
adult independence’ and her evidence from Scotland suggests that the variation in
financial relationships may be at least as great across generations as it is within
couples.
We focus on income as it is received by individuals, before any transfer,
sharing or spending has taken place. Thus our analysis is removed from any
comprehensive measure of welfare by several steps: we neither measure
consumption nor take account of any income in kind generated within the
household. Cash income as it enters the household is of interest in its own right
from two perspectives. First, the distribution of income across household members
can have a strong influence on the distribution of consumption (Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994). Indeed, there is evidence that
changes in the income shares of household members result in changes in spending
patterns. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1995) show that there was a significant
change in shares of expenditure on clothing towards women’s and children’s goods
following the switch from child tax allowances (received by fathers) to child
benefit (received by mothers) in the UK in the late 1970s. The second reason for a
focus on individual incomes prior to any sharing is that differences in access to
cash are likely to have implications for the economic autonomy of each individual
as well as for the distribution of power and influence over decision-making within
the household (Jenkins, 1991).
One approach is to split total household income using a set of arbitrary ratios,
the only variation between households arising from differences in household
composition (see Borooah and McKee (1994), Findlay and Wright (1996) and
Harding (1993)). An alternative used here is to adopt a set of uniform rules for all
households but to assume that the allocation of income within the household
depends on the source of income, introducing some heterogeneity in addition to
variations due to differences in household composition. Each element of income is
allocated to the person who receives it in the first instance. This extreme but
transparent assumption can be seen as a balance to the usual assumption of
complete sharing. It should be noted, however, that it is possible that combinations
of different sharing behaviour could lead to an income distribution that is more
extreme (more equal or more unequal) than either of the distributions generated by
the uniform assumptions.
Section II explains the allocation of collective income in the context of the UK
in 1995–96 and briefly describes the policy simulation model. In Section III, the
distribution of individual incomes is contrasted with the household income
distribution. Differences in the relative positions of men and women in the income
distributions are explored. Nearly all changes in tax and benefit policy would have
implications for the distribution of income within the household and for the
relative incomes of men and women. Here, the effects of two illustrative simulatedFiscal Studies
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policy changes are analysed, in each case contrasted with results at the household
level. In Section IV, the distribution of gains from the introduction of a minimum
wage is examined. This is relevant for two reasons. First, the standard household
sharing assumption usually obscures the fact that many of the beneficiaries of a
minimum wage have low individual incomes: they share households with people
with higher incomes and appear around the middle of the household income
distribution. Second, although an increase in earnings implies an increase in
individual income, this may be offset by a reduction in entitlement to in-work
social security benefits. Depending on how this reduction is allocated within the
household, an increase in income for some may imply a reduction in income for
others, disturbing any balance of power or influence among the individuals within
the household.
The social security system itself embodies assumptions about income sharing
and financial dependency within the household. In Section V, the pattern of gain
and loss from the introduction of a minimum pension guarantee is analysed.
Payment under this scheme depends on an assessment of existing pension income,
and whether this assessment takes place on an independent (individual) or joint
(couple) basis has a major effect on the cost of the scheme. However, conclusions
about the distributional effects of the two alternatives are highly dependent on the
income sharing assumptions used in the analysis. The use of individual income as
the output measure can be used to expose the effects of the dependency
assumptions that are built into the system and to evaluate alternatives. Section VI
concludes.
II. SIMULATING INDIVIDUAL INCOMES
We make use of POLIMOD, the Microsimulation Unit’s tax and benefit model for
the UK. This uses micro-data from the 1991 Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
updated to 1995–96 levels. A description of the model is provided in Redmond,
Sutherland and Wilson (1996). POLIMOD simulates the effect of policy changes
on the distribution of net disposable incomes that is generated using the rules
governing tax and transfer policy in 1995–96. At the household level, this
definition includes income from earnings, investments, pensions, social security,
transfers from other households and student grants less income tax (net of tax
expenditures for mortgage costs, life insurance premiums and pension
contributions), employee and self-employed National Insurance contributions and
local tax. This definition is similar to the ‘before-housing-costs’ measure used in
the Households Below Average Income (HBAI) analysis of household incomes for
the UK (Department of Social Security, 1996). The method is different in some
minor definitional respects, but the major difference is that HBAI uses recorded
information in the FES for the year (or years) in question whereas our analysis
uses data from one year and updates it to a later year. A major part of this process
lies in the simulation of the taxes and many of the social security benefitsWomen, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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according to the rules that apply in 1995–96. The use of simulated rather than
recorded tax and social security information is necessary if the existing income
distributions are to be calculated in a manner consistent with the calculations made
for policy changes. The latter must necessarily be simulated. One might expect the
simulated distribution to be different from the distribution of recorded incomes, for
a number of reasons. Simulations assume that rules are always adhered to.
1 Tax
and benefit calculations derived from ‘snapshot’ household survey data cannot
take account of time delays that may occur in practice or may be built into the
system and which are reflected in the recorded information.
We consider three levels of analysis that are relevant to the units of assessment
used in the British tax and social security systems and that are identifiable within
UK household data: the household, the family and the individual.
2 When
computing household income, the allocation of the elements of income among the
units within the household is of no importance — each element is aggregated
together as though it were of equivalent value to each member of the household.
However, when computing income at the individual level, the allocation is clearly
crucial. Table 1 lists the elements of net household income that can be identified as
accruing at each of the three levels in the UK in 1995–96.
The basic allocation assumption used here is that all income — including
collective income intended for wider units — is retained by the person who
receives it. In general, we are not able to distinguish who actually receives the
collective income in the survey data; instead, we make general assumptions
according to whom the income is paid in the first instance (or to whom the income
is customarily paid). All household elements of net income are allocated to the
head of household.
3 Of family benefits, child benefit and family credit are
allocated to the mother (unless the only adult is the father) because these benefits
are paid to the mother in the first instance.
4 The remainder of the family benefits
                                                                                                                             
1One exception is that we do not assume complete take-up of means-tested benefits. We assume randomly-applied
take-up rates (on a claimant headcount basis) of 91 per cent for housing benefit and council tax benefit, 62 per cent
for family credit and 81 per cent for income support. See Redmond and Wilson (1995) for more information.
2The household is a collection of people who live at the same address with common housekeeping arrangements
(Central Statistical Office, 1992). The family unit is the nuclear family: a couple or single person and any
dependent children sharing the same household. Children are defined as people aged under 16, or under 19 if in
full-time secondary education.
3As defined by the Family Expenditure Survey. In the case of couples, this will be the man. Across generations or in
households of siblings or unrelated adults, the designation of head of household depends on the ownership of the
dwelling or responsibility for the rent (Central Statistical Office, 1992, p. 78).
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are allocated to the man in the case of couples.
5 Sutherland (1996) considers
alternative allocations of collective income.
As well as cash income, another factor calls for special treatment: the
responsibility for children. There are three basic alternatives for its allocation. One
is to take the view that children should be treated as individuals in their own right,
should be allocated their own shares of household income and should take their
independent place in the individual income distribution. This is an attractive
approach since it is simple to implement. However, it has the inevitable result that
children will dominate the bottom quarter of the income distribution. While this
may be realistic from some perspectives, it would obscure the issue on which we
wish to focus: the impact of policy on the income distribution.
The second option is to ignore children themselves while allocating income paid
on their behalf. This is the option taken by Duncan, Giles and Webb (1994) and
Webb (1993). Again, it is attractive for its ease of implementation. But ignoring
the responsibility for children has serious drawbacks if the resulting income
distributions are to be used for the evaluation of policy. As Esam and Berthoud
(1991, p. 22) point out with regard to the assumed sharing of responsibility for
children between parents, ‘... it would be potentially disastrous to incorporate an
assumption that fathers had no responsibility for their children into the tax and
benefit systems’.
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TABLE 1










Earnings, including income in kind,
less occupational pension contributions
Self-employment income
Statutory maternity and sick pay
Occupational and private pensions
Income from investments
National Insurance benefits and pensions
Disability benefits
Maintenance and income from relatives
outside the household
Student grants
less National Insurance contributions
less Income taxWomen, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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The third option, which is chosen here, is to allocate the responsibility for
children to particular adults in the household and to perform the analysis on the
sample of all adult individuals. The allocation of responsibility for children and the
income associated with them is achieved by use of an equivalence scale. The
income of the individual is scaled down by a factor corresponding to the number of
children for whom they are assumed to be responsible.
6 In this exercise, all
children are allocated to the mother (or lone father) and the McClements
equivalence scale is used, rebased so that the reference household is a single
person (McClements, 1977). Table 2 illustrates the effect of the allocation of
income and children for a household consisting of a couple and their two children
aged 10 and 13, a grown-up daughter and her unemployed partner both aged 19,
and this couple’s child aged 1.
Rows 1 to 5 show the receipt (or deduction, in the case of council tax) of
elements of income by each adult member of the household. Rows 6 to 8 show the
calculation of equivalised income on a household basis
7 and rows 9 to 11 show
parallel calculations on an individual basis. In the calculation of the equivalence
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7Using the McClements equivalence scale.
TABLE 2








1. Net earnings 150 0 0 0
2. Income support 0 0 0 88.95
3. Family credit 0 21.50 0 0
4. Child benefit 0 18.85 10.40 0
5. Council tax 20 0 0 0
6. Household income 150.00 + 88.95 + 21.50 + 18.85 + 10.40 – 20.00 = 269.70
7. Household
equivalence ratio
1 (head of household) + 0.64 (wife) + 0.69 (daughter) + 0.59
(partner)
+ 0.44+0.38+0.15 (children) = 3.89
8. Equivalised
household income
269.70 / 3.89 = 69.33
9. Individual income 130 40.35 10.40 88.95
10. Individual
equivalence ratio
1 1.82 1.15 1
11. Equivalised
individual income
130 22.17 9.04 88.95Fiscal Studies
8
ratio for each adult, no economies of scale are assumed to arise from more than
one adult sharing a household.
8
III. HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL INCOMES
This section examines the differences between the distributions of household and
individual incomes, and the proportions of men and women at different points in
the individual income distribution.
The standard method of presenting output from a tax and benefit model ranks
households according to the household net income measure described in Section II
and adjusted by an equivalence ratio as illustrated in row 8 of Table 2. The ranked
households are divided into income ranges or quantiles of the distribution. Figure 1
shows such a distribution (solid line), counting the percentage of households in
£20 weekly income ranges.
                                                                                                                             
8Responsibility for children, assumed to fall on mothers, scales down the respective adult incomes in the same
proportions as assumed for lone parents in the conventional operation of the scale.
FIGURE 1
Household and Individual Incomes
Title:  Sutherland fig 1 
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  29/1/97 4:30 pm
Note: Household: 0.2% have zero or negative incomes; 2.4% have incomes greater than £480.
Individual: 2.1% have zero or negative incomes; 3.2% have incomes greater than £480.
Source: POLIMOD.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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Figure 1 also plots the individual distribution (dashed line). This is
dramatically more unequal than the household income measure.
9 Much higher
proportions of the total are in low income groups, lower proportions are in the
middle and the proportions in high income groups are much the same.
10
A picture of the gender composition of the individual income distribution is
given in Figure 2, where the same information as in Figure 1 is plotted but
decomposed into the proportions who are male and female in each income group.
Not only are female individual incomes on average much lower than male incomes,
but also the distribution of female incomes is much more heavily skewed towards
the low income end, and the upper tail is much less significant.
11
The lower end of the individual income distribution is disproportionately
populated by women and the top by men. Figure 3 plots the proportion of men in
                                                                                                                             
9Gini coefficients for the two distributions are 0.32 (household) and 0.45 (individual). Gini coefficients are
calculated using the computer package INEQ, written by Frank Cowell of the London School of Economics.
10The differences between the household and individual distributions presented here are decomposed and reconciled
by Sutherland (1996).
11Gini coefficients for the male and female distributions are 0.38 and 0.44 respectively.
FIGURE 2
The Distribution of Individual Income, by Gender
Title:  Sutherland fig 2 
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:21 am
Note: 2.1% have zero or negative incomes; 3.2% have incomes greater than £480.
(1.9% of men; 2.2% of women) (5.2% of men; 1.4% of women)
Source: POLIMOD.Fiscal Studies
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each twentieth (5 per cent group or vingtile) of the individual distribution. For
comparison, the proportion of adults who are male in each 5 per cent group of the
household distribution is plotted as well. The gender composition of each income
group is remarkably equal when incomes are ranked on a household basis.
Ranking on an individual basis shows that lower income quantiles are
substantially made up of women and upper quantiles of men. Women slightly
outnumber men in the sample as a whole (1:0.94) but the pattern of composition
by gender is quite symmetrical and smooth over the distribution: about 20 per cent
of the top few groups are women and a similar proportion of the bottom few
groups are men. The middle groups are populated roughly equally by men and
women.
The gender composition of the quantiles of the individual income distribution
shown in Figure 3 provides a useful introduction to the analysis in the next two
sections, which focus on the impact of policy changes on this individual
distribution. Changes that disproportionately affect men will be concentrated on
the upper end of the distribution. Those that particularly affect women will be
concentrated on the bottom end.
FIGURE 3
Gender Composition of Income Quantiles: Percentage of each Group who are Men
Title:  Sutherland fig 3
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:23 am
Source: POLIMOD.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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IV. A NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE
Analysis of the distributional impact of the introduction of a minimum wage in the
UK typically produces a picture of the cash benefit accruing mainly to the middle
sections of the household income distribution (Gosling, 1996; Sutherland, 1991
and 1995). This can be explained by a number of factors. The very poorest
households contain few earners. Reductions in means-tested benefit entitlements
offset much of the gain for some families. A third explanation lies in the implicit
sharing assumption inherent in the household-level analysis. Many of the
individuals benefiting from a minimum wage are women living in couples,
typically working part-time and on low hourly wage rates. Another group
benefiting disproportionately is young people, still living with their parents.
Because low-paid individuals are often living with other people on higher incomes,
the use of household income as the ranking variable places them towards the
middle of the income distribution. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of a £4 hourly
minimum wage on the household income distribution (solid line).
12
Analysing the impact of a minimum wage on individual incomes allows us to
investigate three additional aspects of the change: first, the distribution of benefit
by individual income group; second, the pattern of gain and loss within
households; and third, the impact of the change on men and women separately.
These are examined in turn.
1. Impact on Individuals
Figure 4 shows the proportion of the total net benefit from the introduction of a
minimum wage that is received by the population of adults ranked into 20 equal-
sized groups (or vingtiles). The shape of this distribution (dashed line) is quite
different from that of the household distribution plotted on the same graph. Nearly
all the benefit from a minimum wage (83 per cent) is concentrated in the bottom
half of the individual distribution, contrasted with 55 per cent in the household
case.
There is a clear bimodal distribution of benefit for individuals, with one peak
around the 20–25th percentile and another around the median. Interestingly, the
bimodal pattern is not apparent for a lower level of minimum wage. Simulation of
a £3 hourly minimum gives rise to a single peak around the 20–25th percentile. A
higher minimum wage of £5 reproduces this lower peak but also produces a much
stronger second peak around the median. This suggests that this middle-income
peak is due to a concentration of people with hourly earnings between £3 and £5
who are mainly working full-time: hence their substantial gain from a modest rise
in hourly earnings and their position in the middle of the pre-minimum-wage
                                                                                                                             
12The UK currently has no minimum wage. The introduction of an illustrative £4 flat-rate hourly minimum is
simulated for UK employees aged 18 to 64. No changes in behaviour on the part of employees or employers are
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distribution of all individuals. The peak nearer the bottom of the distribution is due
to a concentration of part-time employees on very low hourly wage rates. They
benefit from any level of minimum wage (between £3 and £5) but their total gain
is relatively small because of the few hours that they work.
2. Losers and Gainers
On a household basis, 3.7 million households (16 per cent) benefit from a
minimum wage and there are no households that suffer a substantial loss.
13
However, on an individual basis, while some people in households gain, others in
the same household may bear the loss of benefit withdrawal. Under the income
allocation rules adopted here, 4.19 million individuals gain (9.6 per cent of adults)
and 0.26 million lose (0.6 per cent).
14
                                                                                                                             
13Small net cash losses may occur because of non-linearities in the system of means-tested benefits: there are
minimum payments attached to some benefits and some non-tapered thresholds of entitlement (e.g. for the levels of
non-dependant deduction in income support and housing benefit).
14Sutherland (1996) shows that, unlike most of the other results reported here, the estimates of the numbers of losers
are sensitive to the choice of income allocation rule. Assumptions that imply a greater degree of within-household or
within-family sharing of social security income result in more individuals losing (the losses being shared by more
people).
FIGURE 4
The Introduction of a £4 Minimum Wage:
Percentage of Benefit Received, by Household or Individual Income Level
Title:  Sutherland fig 4
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  29/1/97 4:33 pm
Source: POLIMOD.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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Two examples illustrate typical effects. First, a householder finds their housing
benefit reduced because their low-paid son’s increase in earnings triggers an
increase in the amount the authorities assume he contributes to the rent. Since we
assume no intra-household transfers, it is the householder who bears the loss.
Another example is where a male partner’s earnings rise, causing the family’s
entitlement to family credit to fall. Under the present income allocation
assumptions, all the family credit reduction is assumed to fall on the woman.
3. Men and Women
Women are more than twice as likely as men to be direct beneficiaries of a £4
minimum wage: 13 per cent of women benefit compared with 6 per cent of men.
Nearly all beneficiaries (90 per cent of both sexes) live in households with other
adults present and, in particular, 73 per cent of female and 41 per cent of male
beneficiaries live in couples. However, losses due to benefit reductions are equally
likely among men and women on the basis of the income allocation rules adopted
here (0.6 per cent of each group). Although, in individual cases, women may lose
family credit (or other benefits if they are the head of household), the introduction
of a minimum wage would shift the share of aggregate household income in
women’s favour.
The pattern of benefit from a minimum wage across the individual income
distribution, as shown in Figure 4, can be decomposed into the proportion that
goes to men and that that goes to women. Figure 5 plots these distributions for
individuals, and for men and women separately, ranked by their individual
incomes. (The height of the dotted line, for women, plus the height of the dashed
line, for men, gives the solid line, for all adults.) This shows that it is women who
receive most of the benefit in the bottom half of the distribution, and particularly
at the very bottom, reflecting the lower average earnings of women and the
prevalence of very low earnings among women. Men in the top half of the
distribution benefit to a greater degree than women. This reflects not only the fact
that there are a higher proportion of men there (see Figure 3), but also that some
men on low wage rates work very long hours.
The bimodal shape of the distribution of benefit is evident in both the male and
female distributions separately. One might expect the second peak, around the
median, to contain a disproportionate number of men, given the concentration of
full-time earners among these beneficiaries, as discussed above. Although this is
the case, it does not provide a complete explanation for the shape of the
distribution. A further factor explaining the dip in the distribution, which applies
to both men and women, is the fact that the region of income between the modal
points coincides with income support benefit levels. The scope for earning while in
receipt of income support is extremely limited, suggesting that this region of the
distribution (between the 25th percentile and the median) contains a concentration
of people who cannot benefit directly from a minimum wage. Those below thisFiscal Studies
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region are either living on incomes below social assistance level or, more typically,
living in families with individuals who have higher incomes.
V. A MINIMUM PENSION GUARANTEE
As an approach to the problem of low pensioner incomes, without recourse to
means testing, Atkinson (1995, ch. 16) put forward the idea of a minimum pension
guarantee (MPG). The state would make up each pensioner’s retirement income to
a guaranteed level, taking fully into account any income from state, occupational
and private pensions as well as any state benefits not related to disability. Other
income would be disregarded. Part of the aim of the scheme would be to provide a
guaranteed income on an individual basis. This is in contrast to the existing state
retirement pension, which provides a reduced pension for the dependent wives of
male pensioners.
15 The means-tested social assistance benefits that underpin the
National Insurance pension system are also assessed on the basis of the couple’s
joint income and are paid at a lower rate for the couple than for two single people.
The relative size of the insurance pension and assistance benefit is such that many
                                                                                                                             
15Women who have made sufficient contributions in their own right qualify for their own full pension and widows
of full pensioners inherit a full derived rights pension.
FIGURE 5
The Introduction of a £4 Minimum Wage:
Percentage of Benefit Received, by Individual Income Level and by Gender
Title:  Sutherland fig 5
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:24 am
Source: POLIMOD.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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pensioners, without other sources of income, are subject to means tests and live on
the lowest family incomes.
16
Atkinson (1995) showed that a MPG scheme would be substantially cheaper
than increasing the state retirement pension to the same level. Even so, it would
not be cheap to provide a guarantee at a level that would substantially reduce
dependence on social assistance. This is because, paid on an independent basis and
subject to a test of the individual’s pension income, substantial extra resources are
targeted on wives currently in receipt of reduced pensions. The attractions of
reducing the cost of a MPG scheme by mirroring the current system, assessing on
a joint basis and paying a reduced pension to couples, are evident. An analysis at
the household (or family) level suggests that the advantages of a joint guarantee
are significant and does not illuminate the disadvantages. Here, we present the
household-level picture for an independent guarantee (as suggested by Atkinson)
and a joint scheme that costs the same amount. The impacts of the same schemes
on the individual income distribution are then examined, and finally we focus on
the effect of the two alternative MPG structures on male and female pensioner
incomes.
1. Independent and Joint MPGs: Effect on Household Incomes
The introduction of a £90 MPG would have had a net cost of £3.35 billion per
year if introduced in 1995–96 on a joint basis for couples.
17 The income paid
under the guarantee is treated as taxable income and is counted as income in the
calculation for means-tested benefits.
18 The additional guarantee for the wife is
calculated at the same rate as the existing Category B (‘married women’s’)
pension: 60 per cent. Thus the total level of guarantee for a couple is £144 and is
sufficient to bring most pensioners above income support levels.
To compare the effect of a joint guarantee with that of an independent
guarantee, we simulate a scheme that has the same net revenue cost (£3.35
billion). This provides for a guarantee to all individuals aged 65 or over at a level
of £69.65 per week. Thus single pensioners are less well provided for compared
with the joint scheme by £20.35 per week. Couples, too, are less well provided for,
by £4.70 per week. The independent scheme is less generous in the level of
guarantee it can provide because it covers a larger number of people than the joint
scheme. Assessment of pension income on an individual basis means that more
pensioners living in couples (and jointly assessed under the joint guarantee) are
                                                                                                                             
16In 1995–96, the basic insurance pension for a single person was £58.85 per week. The addition for a wife (where
she did not have a pension based on her own contributions) was £35.25. The social assistance (income support)
levels for a couple and a single person aged 65 (with no extra needs) were £101.05 and £65.10 respectively.
17We assume that the MPG is introduced for people aged 65 or more, and that take-up of the MPG is complete.
Throughout this section, ‘pensioners’ are defined as people aged 65 or more.
18The net revenue cost is made up of a gross cost of £6.09 billion, offset by an increase in income tax of £0.28
billion and a reduction in the cost of social assistance of £2.46 billion.Fiscal Studies
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entitled to receive extra income under the independent guarantee. In particular,
married women receiving only the Category B pension under the current system
would find that they benefit considerably from independent assessment.
Figure 6 compares the distribution of average cash gain from the two schemes
by household income level.
19 The joint guarantee (solid line) is particularly well
targeted on low-income households, with 64 per cent of the benefit being received
by the bottom 30 per cent of households. The independent guarantee (dashed line)
also primarily benefits the lower end of the distribution, but less (47 per cent) is
targeted on the bottom 30 per cent.
2. Independent and Joint MPGs: Effect on Individual Incomes
In order to investigate whether the apparent distributional advantages of the joint
scheme continue to hold at the individual level, we repeat the simulations at that
level. The income allocation rule assumes that existing pension income is allocated
to the individual who receives it. Thus married women receive their
                                                                                                                             
19All households are included, not only those containing pensioners.
FIGURE 6
Minimum Pension Guarantee:
Average Household Gain, by Household Income Level
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own pension, including their Category B pension. The allocation of the
independent guarantee is straightforward: the pension income assessment takes
into account the individual’s own income only, and the payment of any income
under the guarantee is made to each individual. Accounting for a joint guarantee
on an individual basis is less straightforward. The level of the joint guarantee is set
with reference to the individual’s family status. In the case of a couple, the
assessment of pension income takes both partners’ pension income into account.
Here we assume that any resulting joint payment under the guarantee is split
equally between the couple.
20
Figure 7 compares the distributions of average cash gain from the joint scheme
and from the independent scheme by individual income level. In contrast with the
household-level picture, the scheme best targeted on the pensioners with lowest
incomes is the independent scheme (dashed line). This is quite a striking result,
particularly so when one bears in mind the relatively small proportion of all
pensioners who are married women (24 per cent) and who stand to benefit
particularly from independent assessment and payment.
                                                                                                                             
20Sutherland (1996) explores the effect of splitting the payment in other proportions.
FIGURE 7
Minimum Pension Guarantee: Average Gain, by Individual Income Level
Title:  Sutherland fig 7
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3. Women and Men Pensioners
When carrying out analysis at the individual level, it is straightforward to focus on
individual pensioners, excluding younger people. Figure 8 plots the average gain
by pensioners in each decile (10 per cent group) of the individual pensioner income
distribution. The contrast between the impacts of the joint and of the independent
MPG schemes is still apparent: the gain is much more closely targeted on the
lowest-income pensioners in the independent case.
Figure 8 also shows the proportion of each pensioner decile that is male (right-
hand axis; dotted line). Not only do female pensioners outnumber males overall,
but there is a dramatic gradient across income levels: there are virtually no men in
the bottom 10 per cent; the top 10 per cent contains 69 per cent men. It is to be
expected, therefore, that the main beneficiaries of both joint and independent
schemes will be women, and that this will be most clearly the case for the
independent guarantee. Figures 9a and 9b show the average gain by decile of male
and female pensioners’ income respectively, for both the independent and the joint
schemes. Under the joint scheme, men and women benefit roughly equally.
Although it is the middle of the female distribution and the bottom of the male
distribution that benefit most, the actual income levels of these groups are much
the same.
FIGURE 8
Minimum Pension Guarantee: Average Gain to Individual Pensioners
Title:  Sutherland fig 8
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:25 am
Source: POLIMOD.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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FIGURE 9
Minimum Pension Guarantee: Joint and Independent Schemes
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Under the independent scheme, almost all the benefit is targeted on women, and
particularly on the female pensioners with the lowest incomes. Men in some
deciles actually lose slightly on average, although the lowest-income male
pensioners also benefit.
The relative effect of independent and joint MPG schemes looks quite different
depending on the unit that is considered in the analysis. The independent scheme
modelled here is better targeted on the pensioners with the lowest incomes. It
almost exclusively benefits women, when considered on an individual basis. The
most critical aspect of a MPG scheme, in terms of its cost and its effect on
individual incomes, is the unit of assessment for pension income that is chosen.
None of these results is apparent from an analysis at the household level.
VI. CONCLUSION
The minimum sharing assumptions that have been employed in this analysis are
not intended to be realistic: clearly, most households do share income to some
extent. Our analysis itself provides evidence for this, since large numbers of
women and some men would be living on resources at a level so low as to be
unsustainable, were it not for sharing. For example, Figure 1 shows that 2.1 per
cent of adults have zero or negative incomes on an individual basis. Davies and
Joshi (1995) come to similar conclusions about the importance of sharing.
However, investigations of the implications of minimum sharing and the approach
taken in this paper are of value from a number of perspectives.
• We have analysed income as it enters the household, before any sharing,
spending or consumption can take place. Policy changes that alter the absolute
and relative sizes of the incomes of individual members of households may lead
to changes in the extent of sharing. It is of interest to establish, on the one
hand, the adjustments that the family or household must accommodate if the
status quo is to be maintained and, on the other hand, the shift in any balance
of power or influence that is implied by a change in the within-household
distribution of income, whether or not these adjustments take place.
Furthermore, the possibility that some individuals may benefit at the expense of
other household members is an aspect of policy design that should be
monitored, but is entirely absent from a household analysis.
• Policy analysis by gender illuminates the quite striking differences that
continue to exist between the sexes. We find that the bottom of the individual
distribution is dominated by women. The analysis of the impact of the
minimum wage shows that even a policy measure designed to reach the low-
paid in fact benefits women in the middle of the female distribution. Thus even
low-paid, part-time workers count as relatively well off when compared with
women as a whole.Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income
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• An exploration of the effects of the sharing and dependency assumptions built
into the benefit system requires that these assumptions are not replicated by the
method of analysis. An individual analysis can expose the effects of
dependency assumptions.
• Minimum sharing can be seen as a balancing assumption to that of full sharing.
For a particular household, reality is somewhere in between the two extremes
and would be very difficult to capture and measure. Conclusions about the
distributional impact of policy options may be quite different when analysed at
the individual and household levels: the analysis of the minimum pension
guarantee is a good illustration. Policymakers should have access to both sets
of such results when making decisions.
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